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Criteria for justice today are mostly discussed within the formal 
framework of social welfare functions (SWF) developed by K. Arrow 
in (51). 1 This is also what I shall do in this paper. 
Let Z be a set of states, 1= | l . .,nj a set of persons, and let there 
be defined a utility function U{ for each of these persons on Z . 2 If u 
is the n-tuple ( u j , . . . ,u n), a SWF is a function that assignes to each 
u on Z a quasi-ordering R(u) on Z . 3 If x , y , z , . . . are states in Z we 
read "xR(u)y" as "x is socially not better than y", and set xP(u)y := 
xR(u)y A ~~](yR(u)x) - "y is socially better than x" - and xG(u)y 
:= xR(u)y A yR(u)x - "x and y are equally good socially " . 4 
Besides the postulates of unrestricted domain (R(u) is to be 
defined for all possible u's on Z) and of invariance with respect to 
common positive linear transformations of the u^,5 the minimum re-
quirements for such SWF's are: 
Anonymity: R(u) is to be invariant with respect to permutations of 
the indices 1,. . . ,n, 
and the (strong) 
Pareto Conditions: A i (UJ (x)=Uj (y)) D xG(u)y 
A i ( U i (x) < uj (y)) A V k ( u k (x) < u k (y)) D 
xP(u)y. 
Both conditions seem to me essentially unproblematic, but do not 
1. A good exposition of this theory is Sen (70). 
2. Such utility functions are metrisations of subjective preferences on Z; they 
are uniquely determined up to positive linear transformations. 
3. R(u) need not be a total ordering, though that is mostly stipulated. 
4. For simplicity we only discuss SWF's here that are defined on utility func-
tions, not on preference relations. The latter are devoid of deeper interest 
anyhow. 
5. We shall not go into the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utilities 
here. Cf. Harsanyi (55), (75) and Sen (70), ch. 7. 
suffice to determine one single S W F 6 , and all further postulates are 
hotly disputed. 
In moral philosophy SWF's are mostly employed in the setting of 
ethical subjectivism to define a comprehensive ordering of moral 
values from individual preferences. Against such a conception there 
are, however, serious objections which I shall mention only briefly 
here:7 
1. In order to make morally prescribed actions rational one has to 
adapt one's individual preferences to the moral one, expressed by a 
SWF R(u). But since the original utility functions u are the basis of 
the moral ranking R(u), and adapting one's preferences to R(u) 
means going over to some u', R(u') may contradict R(u), so that 
orienting one's preferences towards moral criteria may upset the 
social ordering of the states. If, however, the individual preferences 
from which the social one is defined are only to express the Eigen-
interests of the participants, i.e. the interests they would have on the 
assumption that all the other people concerned were indifferent be-
tween the states in Z , one does not take factual altruistic interests of 
the participants into account but only their egoistic ones. It would 
be forbidden then to forgo advantages in favor of others. 
2. Not all factual interests are to be respected from a moral point of 
view. Even if somebody has the ardent desire to exploit another per-
son, suppress or torment him, this has not to be reckoned up against 
legitimate interests of others. 
3. R. Nozick has emphasized in (74) that criteria of structural justice 
like SWF's measuring the justness of a state only by how the people 
concerned are situated in it are inadequate at least as general criteria 
for justice. His main argument is this: Such principles would elimi-
nate all freedom: the freedom of control over one's property, the 
6. Harsanyi has shown in (55) that the utilitarian SWF xR(u)y :- Z Uj(x) < 
X u; (y) is the only one to satisfy the postulates stated above, if the Uj and R(u) 
i 
are not only defined on Z, but on the power set of Z according to the principle 
U * ^ = wpQ xeX U* ( x ) ^ x ) ^ c ^ - T° assign probabilities to the states of 
Z, however, is problematic, for the states of Z are generally results of actions. 
While assigning probalities to one's own actions in decision problems is not pro 
blematic, as Jeffrey has shown — the decision criteria do not depend on these 
probabilities —, this is not true for games in which several persons are acting. 
7. For a more detailed discussion cf. Kutschera (77). 
freedom to enjoy the fruits of one's own work or talents. For passing 
from a structurally just state to another state by giving something of 
my property to others or by earning something by additional work 
without sharing it with others will mostly lead to a structurally 
unjust state, and is therefore forbidden. 
Al l these are no objections against the usefulness of SWF's in 
defining criteria for justice, but only objections against defining moral 
criteria by SWF's alone, and in this way by subjective preferences 
only, and against searching for one SWF as a general moral criterion 
for all cases. We shall evade them by admitting some objective moral 
judgments that do not depend on subjective preferences, and by 
formulating different SWF's as criteria for justice in different situa-
tions. Following Aristotle we shall distinguish between problems of 
distributive and those of commutative justice. 
Assuming objective moral facts is only justified if methods are 
described by which they can be ascertained. I cannot go into this 
here, and so I just have to presuppose that we can at least make some 
moral judgments without referring to subjective preferences. What is 
needed for the following, more exactly, is that we can make judg-
ments about a person a's obligation (from moral or legal reasons) to 
respect another person's, b's, interest in certain states; that b, con-
versely, has a claim against a to attend to his interests in what he does. 
(Such interests are then always legitimate interests, but not all legi-
timate interests involve a claim against others to cooperate in their 
pursuit). In the narrower sense of the word a claim of b on a doing F 
is an obligation of a to do F . But in the wider sense of the word in 
which we use it here a claim of b against a involves only an obligation 
of a to do something in so far as he can do so under the given circum-
stances and in view of other obligations that he has. Claims in this 
sense do not imply categorial obligations (conditional or prima-facie 
ones) of a to do something. They can be compared as to strength; 
they admit of different degrees. 
On the presupposition that such claims are defined I shall now 
propose criteria for distributive and commutative justice. 
Criteria of distributive justice are relevant in cases, where the 
people concerned have a claim against a single person or a group of 
persons — we shall call him, or it, D (the distributor) - to consider 
their interest in some specific commodity G . 8 G can be some 
material good, like food, but it can also be chances or tasks, for there 
is also a just distribution of burdens. D is to have the control over the 
distribution. D can be some outside instance, for example a public 
office, or some or all of the people in I. 9 A distribution may be cal-
led just if it satisfies the claims of the different people concerned as 
equally as possible. Since the claims are against D it cannot concern 
him whether somebody is willing to forego his claim in favor of some 
third party. Therefore the interests are to be considered as Eigen-in-
terests. Whether someone is willing to donate something of his share 
to another or to give it to him in fulfillment of some prior obligation 
is of no concern to the distributor or to the justness of the distribu-
tion. 
Let vj (x) be a measure for the utility of the person i in state x 
resulting from his Eigen-interests on which his claim against D is 
based in the specific situation considered. vx (x) is then a measure for 
the degree in which the claim of i against D if fulfilled in x . 1 0 Then 
we can designate a state of Z as just, in which 
a) those who are worst off with respect of G are situated as well as 
possible, and moreover 
b) the claims of all with respect to G are satisfied as far as that is pos-
sible without bringing somebody into a worse position. 
The first postulate (a) is the Maximin-criterion or Difference-
principle, as Rawls terms it in (72). It expresses the idea that the 
claims of all are to be considered equally. According to this idea the 
claims of all are to be satisfied up to the maximum that can be dis-
tributed to all. The claims that go beyond are also legitimate, but it 
would not be justified to let somebody pay for another's better posi-
8. For simplicity I only consider the distribution of one commodity here. 
9. A claim against oneself to something is a right to pursue it as far as no con-
flicting obligations are violated. 
P 
10. Each person assesses the states under certain aspects F.If u.(x) is the 
(subjective ) value of x for i under aspect F Uj(x), the total utility of x for i, is a 
F G 
weighted mean of the u .(x)'s. If u .(x) is the value of x for i under the aspect of 
^ ^ G 
the commodity G and if i's interest in G involves a claim of i against D,VJ(X)=V . -
tion. Further choices are therefore restricted to criteria of effectivity. 
This is the postulate of Pareto-Optimality (b) . 1 1 
We can then say: 
DC: A state is distributeely just iff the minimum of the degrees in 
which the individual claims are met is maximal in it and if -
given this restriction - it is most effective,1 2 
Since this concept of distributive justness essentially follows the 
difference principle - the Pareto-condition is very weak — one could 
raise the usual objections against this principle also against DC, 
namely: 
1. Minimal advantages for the least advantaged may be bought by 
considerable losses to the better situated. The total utility for all 
concerned is not maximal; some of the good may be squandered just 
for reasons of equality. 
2. That somebody is worse off is considered twice: firstly in that the 
same amount of the good still means a lower total utility for him, 
and secondly in the orientation of the difference principle on the 
least advantaged.1 3 
3. The criterion does not preclude big utility-differences and there-
fore does not come up to the ideal of an equal distribution. 
These objections, however, become pointless in our case, in which 
the difference principle is just applied to distribution problems. Ob-
jection (1) is based on the utilitarian idea that bigger advantages 
always have precedence over smaller disadvantages. But this idea is 
not applicable in our problem, since the aim is not to get a maximal 
total untility, but to give to each "his own", to fulfill the claims of 
all concerned impartially. A distribution of a cake is not just if it 
11. In the usual formulations of these principles the utility functions uj are 
to be replaced by vj, of course. 
12. The order in which the two criteria (a) (difference principle) and (b) 
(Pareto-optimality) are applied does not matter. If for XCZ we set P(X) := {x: 
X€X A Ay(yeX A Vi(x<iy ) D Vk(y<kx))}and M(X) := {k: xeX A Ay (yeX D 
min Uj (y) < mjn Uj (x))) J , we have P(M(X)) = M(P(X)). Sincejthe Paretoicondi-
tions do not define a total quasi-ordering on Z, neither does DC. But although 
P(M(X)) defines only a partial ordering of the states in Z, it is a suitable choice 
function for social decisions. 
13. Cf.Harsanyi(75). 
gives those most who like it best; if it transforms the cake, so to 
speak, in a maximal total subjective gain, but only if everyone gets 
the same according to the claim he has against the distributor. 
Objection (2) is off the point in our case, since only interests in 
one specific good are considered. Somebody does not get more in a 
just distribution of the cake if he is shortsighted. The values Vj (x) do 
not express the degree to which all interests of i — not even all 
legitimate ones — are fulfilled in x, but only the degree to which i's 
claim against D on G is satisfied. 
Objection (3) is not applicable here, since it would be patently 
absurd to give the least advantaged less only in order to achieve a hig-
her degree of overall equality. The basis of such egalitarianism is 
envy, and envy is no moral criterion. 
One of the most important cases is the distribution of an arbitrarily 
divisible commodity like money or food. Here everyone will get such 
a share that all claims are satisfied in the same degree. If the people 
have the same claims, i.e. if the functions V j coincide, DC will result 
in everybody getting the same share of G . A just distribution often is 
simply an equal distribution, and this is adequate if all the people 
have equal claims on G . But an equal distribution would be inade-
quate, if equal parts of G would not satisfy the claims equally. What 
somebody can regard as "his own" depends on the claims he and the 
others have. Therefore not equality alone, but equality in proportion 
to the strength of everybody's claim on G renders a distribution just. 
If the people concerned have claims on the distributor to get a 
share of the commodity G , he may not leave somebody worse off 
than it would be possible without putting somebody else iri a posi-
tion at least as bad as the one the first is in now. Every other distrib-
ution would consider the claim of someone less than that of other 
people, and cannot therefore be justified morally, since all the moral 
criteria relevant for the case on hand are incorporated in the claims. 
It can be easily seen, that this postulate is equivalent to the dif-
ference principle. If, further on, it is possible for D to give a better 
position to some without impairing the position of others, D is 
obliged to do so, since the first have a claim against D which he can 
fulfill in the given circumstances without violating the claims of 
others. This is the Pareto condition. 
DC, therefore, is just an explication of D's obligations in view of 
the claims the differnent persons have against him. It tells us how to 
satisfy conflicting claims. 1 4 
Criteria for commutative justice are to be applied in cases of 
free cooperation between several persons. A typical example is the 
sale of an object. If for the seller it has a value equivalent to an 
amount ej of money, to the buyer a monetary equivalent of e2, a 
sale will result only if ej<e2. The problem is: What price in the inter-
val (ej ,e2> is a fair or just price for the object? To give a general for-
mulation for the problem we have to use some simple concepts of 
game theory. 
Let 1= {l , . . . ,n | again be a group of persons, all of which may, in 
a situation S, choose between the actions in F = j f i >• • • f^-15 Z is to 
be the set of results which arise from the possible combinations of 
the actions of the players. We can then represent the states x,y,z,. . . 
of Z as n-tuples (fjj, . . . ,fjn) with j . = l , . . . ,m. On Z an utility-
function U j is to be defined for all players iel. 
In game theory cooperative and non-cooperative games are dis-
tinguished. A game is cooperative, if the players can have pre-play 
communication and can agree, which action everybody is to perform. 
Such agreements are to be binding. We only consider such coopera-
tive games in what follows. In our problem of commutative justice 
we shall assume, that the players have no obligations to effect or pre-
vent certain states in Z independent of their problem to achieve a 
just result, and that none of them has an independent claim on 
others regarding his interests in the game; otherwise criteria of dis-
stributive justice would be prevalent. 
If O := {x: Ay i (UJ (y) < U j (x))} is the set of results that are op-
timal for all players, the game is completely trivial in case 0=Z; no 
cooperation is then necessary to achieve results that are optimal for 
all players. If 0#Athe game is still trivial in the sense, that all players 
will agree on some result of O - which is no matter of concern to 
14. If the claims do not conflict, there are elements of Z which are optimal 
for all concerned (with respect to their interests in G), and D then has to realize 
one of those states according to DC. 
15. For simplicity we only consider choices between finitely many alterna-
tives. That all players can choose between the same alternatives can be assumed 
without loss of generality: If i (i=l,.. . ,n) has a choice between f j j , . . . . f^ 
the f i , . . . ,fm can be so defined, that for i doing fj is the same as doing fjj, etc. 
them; there still is no competition between the players. The relevant 
cases are games in which the interests of the players partly coincide, 
so that cooperation is to their advantage, and partly diverge, so that 
there is a problem of a fair compromise. We shall however formulate 
our criterion for commutative justice in such a way that it also covers 
the trivial cases. 
The security level of i is up := max min Uj(x) f x:(x)j = f, where 
(x)j is to be the i th member of x, i.e. fj. for f=(fjj, . . • ,fjn). u ° i s the 
value i can secure for himself without cooperation, no matter what 
the other players do. 
Now x is a reasonable compromise of the players only if xeP and if 
x does not give anyone less than his security level. The set N := PH 
fx: A i (u?< uj (x))}, where P is the set of Pareto-optimal results, 1 6 
is the negotiation set. N is never empty. xeN is a necessary condition 
for reasonable compromises, and the question is only: On which 
result in N should the players agree; which results in N are fair com-
promises? 
This question is hotly disputed in game theory even for the sim-
plest case of two-person games, and it has often been doubted whether 
there are purely rational criteria, by which subsets of N may be 
determined. If we don't ask for rational, but for fair solutions, 
however, the following criterion suggests itself (for n=2): 
C C : A result x is commutatively just iff it belongs to the negotia-
tion set, and if it maximizes the minimal gains of the partici-
pants as measured against their security levels. 
The postulate to distribute the gains from a cooperation equally in 
this sense is also recommended by rationality considerations: For the 
incentive for cooperation depends on the gain, and a compromise is 
the likelier (and also the stabler) the greater the common incitement 
for it is, i.e. the minimum of the individual incitements. 
In game theory, however, there are considerations according to 
which CC-solutions are not always rational. In the game 
16. P:= {x: ArtViOtfx) < uj (y)) D V k ^ y ) <ik(x)))}. 
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where 1 has the choice between the rows and 2 between the columns, 
and the utilities of 1 are the lower left-hand values in the fields, those 
of 2 the upper right-hand ones, we have u^=u^=-l, N={ (1,1), ( 2 , 2 ) } . 
CC therefore singles out result ( 2 , 2 ) . But here 2 can threaten 1 to do 
f i . For 1 it would then be best also to do f j , so that 2 achieves the 
result optimal for him. A threat of 1 to do f 2 would be unrealistic, 
for 1 will suffer a considerable loss if 2 does not yield to the threat. 
2 then has a greater "threat potential" in this game, and therefore 
(1,1) might be considered as the rational solution. Such considera-
tions, however, degenerate into rather naive psychological arguments. 
A threat of 1 to do f2 can be quite realistic if 1 proceeds after the 
motto "Everything or nothing". Rational considerations of the 
players would have to be based on probability assignments to the 
other's reactions to their own actions and threats. But first, there are no 
general principles available for that, and second, the players cannot 
refer to such probabilities in their negotiation since the other can 
always say: "I'm going to refute your expectations". The only thing 
they can rely on in the negotiations is what the other has no in-
fluence on, and this is only their security levels. 
Furthermore we are not interested here in what is rational, but in 
what is fair, and for this question threats of refusing to cooperate are 
irrelevant. Our question is: how is the legitimate interest of all 
players to derive as big an advantage as possible from the cooperation 
to be satisfied in an impartial manner? In this case the natural 
advantages can only be measured by what the players already have in-
dependently of a cooperation, and that is their security level. 1 7 
17. Measuring gains from cooperation with respect to what everybody has 
for sure if results of N are chosen would not be just. Such results are already the 
fruit of cooperation, and since NCP,some people may already have given con-
n-person games, for n>2, are much more complicated in that coali-
tions may form in which the participants agree on a common stra-
tegy, and thereby act like an individual against outsiders. Coalitions 
siderable advantages to others. These should then not be disregarded in further 
considerations. In the game 
3 
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we have P=N={(1,1),(1,2),(2,1)}, u°=-6, u°=0 , u°(N)=3, u°(N)=L CC singles 
out 1, but the criterion of maximizing gains measured against what everyone 
has for sure in N would single out (2,1). By going over to N, 2 loses his natural 
advantage, and now 1 is advantaged and gets a result, that is almost optimal for 
him. Furthermore, decisions for cooperation cannot be partitioned into two 
steps: one decision for cooperation with the aim of realizing a result from N, and 
after that a decision for some specific result in N. Cooperation from the very be-
ginning is an agreement on a certain result. In our example the 2-step argument 
would result in forgetting in the second step what 2 has done for 1 in the first 
one. - According to Nash's criterion FI (uj(x)-uP) is to be maximized on N. In 
our example this would also single out (1,1), but in the case of the game 
83 1 
2 0 
0 10 
1 10 
Nash's criterion singles out (1,1), CC however (2,2), which seems more ap-
propriate since in (1,1) the gains are distributed very unequally. Nash, however, 
was discussing repeated games, which we don't. 
are (non-empty) subsets KCI . A strategy of K may be represented by 
a result xv,such that (x)j for all jeK is what j does according to this 
strategy. Since the members of K agree on a strategy x without con-
ferring with outsiders they will choose x in the sense of a decision 
under uncertainty. (Only for K=I there is a decision under certainty.) 
The value of K and x* for a member jeK may be estimated as the mini-
mum of the uj (y) for all y that are compatible with x: Uj (K,x) = 
min U j 
K 
y:y= xw 
(y) for (x~:= Aj (jeK D (y)j=(x)j). We then have 
Uj (I,X)=UJ (x~) and uf = max Uj ({ i} ,x). 
Since the interests of the members of K may diverge, K cannot 
agree on a strategy x without referring to the strategies of other 
coalitions. A member of K may, for instance, insist on a common 
strategy that is advantegeous for him by pointing out, that he may 
also enter other coalitions which offer a good strategy to him. There-
fore we cannot assign a reasonable strategy to a coalition for itself. 
In searching for rational solutions of n-person games we will try to 
generalize the ideas for 2-person games. There the first rationality 
condition was that a solution be in the negotiation set N. The 
concept of a negotiation set may be defined for n-person games in 
the following way: We set Vj£ := {x: Ay(Vi(ieK A UJ (X) < Uj (K,y)) 
D Vk(keK A U k (K,y) < uk(x)))} , 
and 
Vj£ is the negotiation set for the coalition K with respect to I-K. For 
K only such results x are acceptable, for which there is no strategy y 
of K , which has higher value for some members without leaving other 
members worse off. We have V {j} ={ x: Ay(Ui ({ i} ,y) < uj (x* 
= {x: up < Uj (x)}and V p P . For n=2 we have V=Pn |x : A i (Uj 
< Uj(x)) j , and that is the negotiation set discussed above. 
We also have 
xeV = AKy(Vi(ieK A UJ (X) < Uj (K,y)) D VkflceK A U k (K,y) < 
uk(x))) 
A result xeV is therefore stable in the sense that there is no coalition 
K and no strategy y of K such that K could offer to some of its 
members, by pursuing y, an advantage against the result x, while the 
others would not be worse off than in x. 
We can, however, not say, as for n=2, that only results of V are 
rational, since V can be empty for n>2. This is wellknown from the 
paradox of voting. In such cases there will then be no non-trivial 
coalitions containing more than one player, for they would be un-
stable.1 8 If V = A , we can only say then, that a result of PH [x: A i 
(u^ < U j (x))j is to be effected. If we set 
N = fV for V=£A 
. v I n 9 v {i} forV=A 
N is never empty, and we can designate N as the generalised negotia-
tion set. 
How are rational or fair results to be picked out from N? 1 9 Ap-
plying the idea of C C seems to be difficult at first glance, since 
besides the individual security levels u ° we now also have securtiy 
levels Uj (K,x) in coalitions. On what coalition would the players fall 
back if no comprehensive cooperation resulted? 
For our purposes we need not go into that, however. Since all 
results of N are stable, there is no coalition which they could point 
out as their possible alternative. The advantage of forming coalitions 
for them is already exhausted in the determination of N . Finding a 
fair compromise in N is no matter for coalitions anymore,but for the 
single players.2 0 Therefore it seems reasonable to take over CC also 
for n-person games, with N as the negotiation set. 
This definition of commutative justice can be justified thus: The 
cases of free cooperation, to which C C is to be applied only, were 
characterized as games in which there are no independent obligations 
18. It may still be the case, of course, that coalitions form. This depends 
however on the psychology of the players, and is no topic for a rational theory of 
games. 
19. In case of O^A there is no problem again, since we then have N=0, and 
nobody cares about what specific result of 0 is chosen. 
20. A cooperation among all is never worse for anybody than a cooperation 
only in some coalition K, since for all xJC,i: Uj(K,x) < Uj(x w).- If the agreement 
is made between given coalitions, however, which go into the negotations like in-
dividuals, and are, for instance, interested in maximizing their total advantage, we 
have another problem as that of commutative justice. 
of the players among themselves or against third parties to realize or 
prevent certain results. Everyone, therefore, has the right to do what 
is best for him. He has then also a right on the advantages the situa-
tions gives to him. He has no claim against the others to cooperate with 
him in securing a good result, besides the minimum requirement to 
give others advantages that cost him nothing. 2 1 Therefore everybody 
will have to accept that for a cooperation only results of the negotia-
tion set are eligible. Entering into cooperation with others means 
that I expect them to consider my interests, and that I, on my part, am 
willing to consider theirs. By cooperating, therefore, all involved ac-
quire a claim against the others to consider their interests. But then a 
problem of distributive justice arises for them: the problem to distri-
bute the gains from the cooperation in a just way. Since the gain of a 
person i in a cooperatively effected state x against what he already 
had independently is measured by uj (xj-u^ , these gains have to be 
distributed justly according to DC. And this is what CC says. 
We have then - retributive justice aside - a general concept of 
material justice based on the idea of equal treatment of all according 
to their legitimate claims. This idea is, in fact, so simple that it is al-
most unobjectinable. It is practically tautological to say that some-
body is treated justly if his legitimate claims cannot be satisfied to a 
higher degree without satisfying the legitimate claims of another less. 
Any other response to the conflicting claims would be partial, and im-
partiality is an undeniable component of justice. 
The question what distributions or what cooperative agreements 
are just is not completely answered by our criteria DC and C C , of 
course. It has just been reduced to the problem of who has what 
claims on others and what states are permitted independently of 
conflicting interests. But we have tried to show in the beginning of 
this paper that we cannot expect more from a theory of justice. Such 
a theory cannot be the whole of moral philosophy. Therefore we 
can't expect that it defines a comprehensive moral ordering. Reason-
ably we can only expect a theory of justice to answer the question 
"What is just?" with respect to a prior definition of claims, since the 
concern of justice is only with the fulfillment of conflicting claims. 
21. Since all the results in Z are permitted, the interests of all players are 
legitimate. It is not morally justifiable to obstruct others in the pursuit of 
legitimate interests as long as they may be obtained without loss to oneself. 
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